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EPISTEMIC ANALYSIS AND THE POSSIBILITY OF  
GOOD INFORMANTS 
 
JAMES MACBAIN 
Kansas State University 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Edward Craig has proposed that epistemology should eschew traditional 
conceptual analysis in favor of what he calls “conceptual synthesis.” He 
proposes we start not from the finding of necessary and sufficient conditions 
that match our intuitions; rather we start from considerations on what the 
concept of knowledge does for us. In this paper I will explore one aspect of 
Craig’s proposal – the good informant. It is this aspect that is central to 
Craig’s epistemic method and perhaps most problematic. I will evaluate this 
concept by first articulating three initial worries that some have had about 
the concept and then show how each of the initial worries can be quelled by 
looking deeper into the features of what Craig’s proposal is. I then assess 
Craig’s proposal on its own terms by looking at the concept of a good infor-
mant in light of the criteria for an adequate explication. What I will show is 
that while there is much to be sympathetic with in Craig’s proposal, there 
are some open questions that need to be solved in order to say that an ade-
quate explication has been reached. 
 
 
The question as to the appropriate method of epistemic analysis has 
always been an issue for epistemologists. In recent years, the tradi-
tional method utilized in epistemology – conceptual analysis – has 
come under attack from various perspectives. Yet, often no replace-
ment method is given in its place. In two works, “A Practical Explica-
tion of Knowledge” and Knowledge and the State of Nature, Edward 
Craig proposes a new way of doing epistemology. Craig’s epistemic 
method eschews traditional conceptual analysis in favor of what he 
calls “conceptual synthesis.” He proposes we start not from the finding 
of necessary and sufficient conditions that match our intuitions; rather 
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we start from considerations on what the concept of knowledge does 
for us. Though there is much to discuss in Craig’s proposal, in this pa-
per I will explore one aspect – the good informant. It is this aspect that 
is central to Craig’s epistemic method and perhaps most problematic. 
In what follows, I will evaluate this concept by first articulating three 
initial worries that some have had about the proposal. I will then show 
that each of the initial worries can be quelled by looking deeper into 
the features of what Craig’s proposal is. I will then assess Craig’s pro-
posal on its own terms. Instead of looking to counterexamples for pos-
sible problems, I will look at the concept of a good informant in light 
of the criteria for an adequate explication. What I hope to show is that 
while there is much to be sympathetic with in Craig’s proposal, there 
are some open questions that need to be solved in order to say that an 
adequate explication has been reached. 
 
 
1. Conceptual Synthesis and the Role of Good Informants 
 
Instead of the traditional conceptual analysis on the concept of knowl-
edge, Craig proposes to approach epistemology by investigating the 
value of knowledge, i.e., what the concept of knowledge does for us.1 
He asks us to consider what role knowledge plays in our lives, and 
then consider what a concept having such a role might be like and 
what the conditions that would govern the application of such a con-
cept are (Craig 1990, p. 2). His methodology is that of explication. For 
Craig, to explicate a concept is to “construct a new version of it satis-
fying certain standards, with the proviso that to count as a new version 
of that concept it had to emerge with many of its principal features 
intact” (1990, p. 8). His method is similar to Rudolf Carnap’s rational 
reconstruction although on a practical, rather than a theoretical, level. 
It is practical in that it is an explication of a concept that is supposed 
to help the survival of epistemic agents in communities. Thus, Craig’s 
proposal is different than traditional epistemic analysis in three ways: 
first, the proposal changes the order of the inquiry and take the char-
acterization of the value of knowledge first and then assesses how well 
our intuitions fit with that explication; second, it maintains that all 
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features of the explication come from the value of the concept of 
knowledge; and third, we explicate the concept only by evaluating 
what value the concept of knowledge, not knowledge itself, has to 
human life (Schmitt 1992, p. 555).  
So what does the concept of knowledge do for us? Craig maintains 
that the concept of knowledge “is used to flag approved sources of in-
formation” (1990, p. 11). As he states, humans need true beliefs about 
their environment that can serve as a guide to successful actions; 
hence, they need sources of information that will yield true beliefs 
(1990, p. 11). Humans do have “onboard” perceptual sources of in-
formation, but they also need to acquire information from those 
around them if they are to survive. So, humans need ways of evaluat-
ing these sources of information and the concepts that are in use with 
such sources.  
This is where the notion of the informant comes into play. When-
ever one is in the position of seeking information on whether p is or is 
not the case, she first wants an informant who will tell the truth about 
p. Yet, in order to survive, we not only want informants, but rather 
good informants. A good informant is an agent who believes p and p is 
the case, and has some detectable property that correlates her being 
right about p (1990, p. 18). So, in order to be a good informant, one 
must believe p, p must be true, and she must have some property the 
inquirer can detect to inform her that she is to be trusted. Further-
more, we will want a way in which to distinguish good informants from 
not-good informants.  
There is a further interesting dimension to Craig’s notion of an in-
formant. There is an ethical dimension at work here as well as an epis-
temic one. An informant is a “co-operating member of our species” 
(1990, p. 36). An informant is someone who can empathize with our 
situation. That is, she cannot just provide the information, but also 
understand why it is that we want or need the information. This dis-
tinguishes an informant from a mere source of information. Mere 
sources of information cannot exhibit this essentially human element. 
They cannot “know what the inquirer is up to” (1990, p. 36). It is this 
feature that illustrates the situation we are in – epistemic agents who 
treat each others as subjects with the common purpose of obtaining 
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true beliefs and not as mere sources of information from which true 
beliefs will be extracted (1990, p. 36).  
Craig recognizes that one may object to his proposal on the grounds 
that agents can know even when they are unwilling to tell what they 
know and agents also can know even when inquirers cannot detect 
any property that correlates the agent with having a true belief. It is 
here that Craig introduces the “objectivising” of the concept of a good 
informant. The principle of objectivisation states that agents start from 
simple, self-interested concepts and progress from these to more and 
more general, “objective” concepts. Our concept of a knower is the 
objectivised concept of a good informant. A good informant is one 
that is in my interest to find. She supposedly would have information 
for me, has information that is in my concern, will be able to commu-
nicate with me, and is accessible to me (1990, p. 85). Yet, such a con-
cept will not serve a community’s needs. A community will objectivise 
the concept. That is, we will subtract what is relevant to me at a par-
ticular time. Once we objectivise the concept of a good informant, we 
are left with the true belief requirement and the requirement of having 
a property correlating well with true belief on the issue in question, but 
the requirement of having a detectable property will be “diluted” 
(1990, p. 90). This diluting results in our ability to recommend good 
informants to others who detect in ways different than our own. So, I 
can recommend informants to others that they might not normally 
detect and others can recommend informants to me that I cannot de-
tect. So a good informant need not have a property that I can detect 
as long she has a property that someone can detect.  
The bottom line of Craig’s proposal is that an agent who is a good 
informant is a good informant whatever circumstances the inquirer is 
in and whatever attitudes the inquirer has towards the matter (1990, 
p. 91). Thus, a good informant is an agent that has a very high degree 
of possessing a true belief. This high degree must be for all, not just for 
one person in particular circumstances. And the more we objectivise 
the concept; we get closer to the concept of knowledge.  
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2. Some Initial Worries about Good Informants 
 
While the addition of good informants is supposed to, in part, salvage 
epistemic analysis from the traditional problems facing the standard 
practice of finding necessary and sufficient conditions, it does raise 
some immediate questions. In this section I will articulate three wor-
ries some have had.2 First, how and when should we check others’ 
powers of detection? That is, how do we know that the others we are 
trusting do not have worse powers than we do and hence should not 
trust them? Second, what good is objectivising the concept of a good 
informant to that of a knower if the informant won’t talk to anyone? 
And third, if we raise the requirements of a good informant to being 
“very likely to be right,” then such an account will not serve our eve-
ryday purposes.  
 
 
2.1. First Worry – Problem of Worse Detectors  
 
According to Craig’s process of objectivisation, we take the primitive 
concept of a good informant and objectivise it to the point to where it 
is no longer a matter of a person who would inform just myself about 
whether p. This is the move toward that of a knower. We are supposed 
to reach a point where we can no longer worry about recognizing good 
informants and we can trust others since they may have greater powers 
of detection. Yet, what of those that have worse powers of detection 
(Dancy 1992, p. 395)? The problem here is that Craig maintains the 
recognizability requirement will be diluted once we have objectivised 
the concept. Yet, once this requirement is diluted, we can fall victim 
to trusting those who have very weak powers of detection.  
This leads to one of two possible results. First, there should be no 
diluting of the concept. We need in place a way in which to check the 
powers of the detectors. We need a way in which to determine those 
who have strong powers. Or, second, the recognizability requirement 
was never a part of the concept of a knower in the first place (Dancy 
1992, p. 395). That is, when we want to determine whether p is the 
case we want someone who we can recognize as knowing whether p, 
but that is not to say that being a recognizable knower is part of the 
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concept of knower. Dancy illustrates this point with an analogy; “when 
we are looking for someone to heal us, we obviously want someone we 
can recognize as such, but the concept of being a recognizable healer is 
not part of the concept of a doctor” (p. 395). Either option weakens 
Craig’s proposal considerably.  
 
 
2.2. Second Worry – Problem of the Closed-Mouth  
Informant 
 
It is important to note that objectivisation does not only apply to an 
agent finding a good informant, but it also applies to group action. 
When epistemic agents are in groups, they have a considerable interest 
in finding partners who have true beliefs about whether p is the case. 
Furthermore, this interest does not go away even in situations where 
the others in the group are unable or unwilling to convey information. 
This is central to Craig’s proposal. Yet, if it is possible to have a 
knower who will not convey any information to the group, then it 
would seem that the concept of a good informant is irrelevant to that 
of a knower. In other words, if it is possible to have a knower who 
won’t talk to anyone, then it is possible to have a concept of a knower 
without it being the result of the objectivisation of the primitive con-
cept of a good informant (Feldman 1997, p. 211). So, it would seem 
that the concept of a good informant does not have a role in the con-
cept of a knower. 
 
 
2.3. Third Worry – High Standards and Our Everyday  
Epistemic Purposes 
  
According to Craig, we never know how much importance getting the 
correct information has and so the standards for being a knower are 
going to be very high. That is, to be a knower, one must meet very 
demanding standards since we do not know the risks and/or benefits of 
the information. As Craig states: 
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In saying that someone knows whether p we are certifying him as an 
informant on that question, and we have no idea of the practical 
needs of the many people who may want to take him up on it; hence 
a practice develops of setting the standard very high, so that whatever 
turns, for them, on getting the truth about p, we need not fear re-
proach if they follow our recommendation. (1990, p. 94).  
 
So, due to the value that having true beliefs has for us, our objec-
tivised concept of a knower will result in having very high epistemic 
standards.  
The problem here comes from a tension between the high stan-
dards that have been placed and the desire for the proposal to be ap-
plicable to our everyday lives. That is, by setting the standards high, 
we set them too high to please everyone (Feldman 1997, p. 211). Sup-
pose that someone asks me for the best place to get coffee. Now, I re-
strict myself to informing the person of informants who are only very 
likely to be right. It may (and probably will) be the case that I will fail 
to recommend anyone to the person. This would surely fail to satisfy 
many people in everyday circumstances since there would be many 
people who are more than able to be good informants on the question 
of the best coffee even if they are agents who are only, say, merely 
likely to be right (Feldman 1977, p. 211). So, this objectivised concept 
will not serve our purposes in everyday life. We normally do not seek 
out informants who are “very likely to be right” on everyday, trivial 
matters (though what counts as everyday and trivial will be highly sub-
jective). So, Craig’s proposal fails to do exactly what he hoped for at 
the outset, to give us a practical explication. The demands he sets are 
just too high.  
 
 
3. Responding to the Initial Worries 
 
In this section I will attempt to offer some responses to each of the 
initial worries articulated above. Overall, I take it that once we look at 
Craig’s proposal from a broader perspective we see that many of the 
initial worries dissolve.  
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3.1. Responding to the First Worry 
 
In responding to the first worry it is important to remember an initial 
feature of Craig’s proposal – it is a practical explication. The remem-
brance that it is a practical explication is important due to it not being 
problematic that there is a counterexample. Just because we some-
times fall victim to someone with worse powers of detection than our-
selves does not immediately pose a problem for the proposal. That is, 
since we have eschewed the method of providing necessary and suffi-
cient conditions in favor of merely attempting to provide a new ver-
sion of the concept with as many of the practical principal features 
intact, the finding of a counterexample does not initially pose a prob-
lem (Craig 1986–7, p. 214).  
Yet one may respond that this is not merely a counterexample. If it 
is common that we encounter one who has worse powers of detection 
than ourselves, then the practical explication itself is in trouble since 
the concept is not very useful to us in our everyday lives. That is, we 
will have to up the recognizability requirement or drop it in order for it 
to be practical. I believe that Craig can accept the first horn of the 
dilemma without problem. According to Craig, there is a way of de-
termining the powers of detectors. The way this is initially done is by 
the recommendation of others. By saying that someone knows that p, 
we are certifying their status as an informant (1990, p. 94). This status 
as an informant is a status for everyone. In other words, the standard 
being set is very high. Such a high standard allows us to not worry 
about the possibility of finding someone with weak powers of detec-
tion. If someone recommends another as an informant, then she is cer-
tifying that informant as one who meets the high standards for any-
one’s practical needs. That is, whatever anyone’s needs, the recom-
mendation of another as an informant certifies the person as someone 
who can give us the truth about p. It is in this way that the recogniza-
bility requirement is part of the concept of a knower. Hence, I do not 
see that Craig is necessarily plagued by this problem. 
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3.2. Responding to the Second Worry 
 
The problem of the closed-mouth informant turns on the possibility of 
having a knower who will not tell anyone what it is they know. If it is 
possible to have such a person, then the concept of a good informant is 
irrelevant to that of a knower. Yet, Craig has a response to such an 
example. According to Craig, it may not be the case that the infor-
mant wants or is willing to tell me what she knows, but she may be 
willing to tell someone else. The information can travel through the 
“pipeline” to get to me (hopefully) eventually (1990, p. 93). That is, 
the purpose of the information will eventually be satisfied via the 
transferal of information, even if my purposes for having the informa-
tion are not satisfied. It is this that objectivisation is supposed to pro-
vide. Objectivisation is intended to provide a “satisfying… explanation 
of how and why such a concept comes to be formed” (1990, p. 93).  
Now this may seem unsatisfying to some. What of the closed-
mouth informant who just does not tell me, but does not tell anyone? 
In such a case, the group action or group purpose of the information 
fails to be satisfied. But this still fails to falsify the proposal on the ta-
ble. In someone being recommended to us as an informant, they are 
merely being certified as a knower. If the knower does not convey the 
information to us, then it is not the case that they would not be a good 
informant or that they the recommender’s powers of detection are 
weak. All that is being said is that the channels of communication are 
not open. This is not initially problematic for Craig. Craig maintains 
that channels of communication should be open, not that they are 
open. It is the case with the closed-mouth informant that the informa-
tion should be conveyed, it is just that it is not. This does not show 
that the concept of a good informant is not part of being a knower. It 
shows that there is a normative dimension to the conveying of infor-
mation (and one that Craig invokes in his proposal). It is the case that 
I am seeking one who should convey information, but to say that she 
won’t “spill the beans” does not entail that being a good informant is 
not part of being a knower. Thus, while such cases may (and probably 
do) exist, they do not pose a problem to Craig’s analysis of the concept 
of a knower. 
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3.3. Responding to the Third Worry 
 
The problem of high standards and our everyday epistemic practice 
stems from Craig’s demand that when we recommend an informant, 
we are to recommend one that we can certify is very likely to be right. 
This is supposed to put us in the position of not being able to recom-
mend informants in everyday inquisitions since the standard is too 
high. That is, the objectivised concept will not suit our everyday epis-
temic purposes since everyday epistemic situations are such that we, 
more often than not, cannot recommend anyone who meets the certi-
tude standard. The problem with this worry is that it takes Craig’s pro-
posal to dictate that we must recommend only those informants that 
are “very likely to be right.” This is not what Craig is proposing. Craig’s 
proposal maintains that a practice will develop by which we will have 
high standards for informants. I believe, contra Feldman, that we do in 
fact seek out informants who will be very likely to be right. The worry 
trades on the moving from our seeking out such an informant and the 
recommender being able to recommend someone who fits this stan-
dard. It may be the case that the recommender cannot recommend 
anyone since she does not know anyone who has the information that 
we need. It is not the case that neither the recommender nor I have 
impractically high standards, it is that there is no one, to the recom-
mender’s knowledge, who can fulfill the standards we have at the time. 
Everyday situations would seem to coincide with Craig’s proposal 
without much difficulty.  
 
 
3.4. A Final Point about the Initial Worries 
 
I believe that many of the above worries stem from a problem concern-
ing the type of epistemic analysis that Craig is proposing. Craig’s pro-
posal is meant to be a practical explication and not a conceptual 
analysis. Craig intentionally eschews the possibility of his proposal fal-
ling victim to various counterexamples. The reason Craig gives for re-
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jecting conceptual analysis is that ‘knows’ is not susceptible to analysis. 
He claims that any strict definition will fall victim to counterexamples 
where the link between truth and justification breaks down. As he 
states:  
 
[T]here is not going to be any X that absolutely has to be regarded as 
conferring high probability on S’s being right about p no matter what 
else we know about S and his circumstances; there will always be 
something else we could come to believe which would bring us signifi-
cantly to lower our estimate; so examples will always be available to 
show that a proposed analysis does not offer sufficient conditions 
(1986–7, p. 226).  
 
In light of this, Craig proposes that we eschew traditional analysis 
and try an alternative approach.  
It is worth noting that Craig does not offer a substantial argument 
on why conceptual analysis fails. He offers two comments about the 
traditional methodology failure. First, for any proposed analysis, the 
skeptic attempts to argue that our intuitions about the intension of the 
concept determine a smaller extension that our everyday intuitions 
about the extension (1990, p. 1). Now, if the skeptic is correct, we 
have a question as to which set of intuitions should give priority in 
determining the correct folk concept. If the skeptic is incorrect, then 
we need an argument as to why the skeptical worry is in fact non-
problematic. What this points out, according to Craig, is that a con-
siderable amount of epistemological work needs to be done to just to 
say that there is such a folk concept at all and address what is the ap-
propriate methodology to address any such questions (1990, p. 1). 
Second, even if we suppose that we have an analysis that captures our 
folk concept fully, the question still looms as to why has a concept 
which fits the conditions proposed in the correct analysis had such 
widespread use (1990, p. 2). This question leads us to the follow point: 
 
There seems to be no known language in which sentences using 
‘know’ do not find a comfortable and colloquial equivalent. The im-
plication is that it answers to some very general needs of human life 
and thought, and it would surely be interesting to know which and 
how (1990, p. 2).  
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The worry here is that more complex the analysis to the concept, 
the harder it will become to answer these questions.  
Craig treats such concerns as problematic to the point where we 
should move off into a different direction – a practical explication. 
This move is what dissolves many of the worries. Craig’s proposal of-
fers him a way of side-stepping proposed counterexamples that do not 
directly play into the conditions he has set for the explication. So, if 
one is to accurately assess Craig’s proposal it would seem that one has 
to change her epistemic venue and approach the question of whether 
Craig has given an adequate explication qua explication. Let us now 
turn to this question. 
 
 
4. The Explication of ‘Good Informant’ 
 
Craig maintains that his explication is akin to Carnap’s method of ex-
plication (or rational reconstruction). ‘Explication’, as Carnap used 
the term, described a process of revising a concept (1950, pp. 3–8).3 In 
an explication, philosophers take a concept that is too vague (the con-
cept to be revised or the “explicandum”) and replace it by a more pre-
cise concept (the new concept that replaces the original or the “expli-
catum”). The latter concept is to be less vague that the original, but it 
is not to be perfectly precise. The explicatum is intended to be an im-
provement over the previous concept, but it is not intended to suitable 
in all subsequent circumstances. Take, for instance, the concept of 
salt. People may first have this concept in mind when discussing sea-
sonings, but this concept will not do for chemists. For chemists, salt 
will be replaced by the concept sodium chloride (NaCl). This latter 
concept is much more precise than the original. Now, obviously the 
concept of sodium chloride will not work for someone interested in 
physical chemistry, so it may at some time be replaced by a more pre-
cise concept.  
Carnap maintained there are four factors in judging an explication 
to be adequate. First, the explicatum needs to be similar to or, as 
Hanna puts it, “agrees with” the explicandum (1968, p. 36). Philoso-
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phers cannot treat the correspondence between the two concepts as a 
mere coincidence. There needs to be some similarity between the two 
to warrant the explication. Second, the explicatum needs to be as ex-
act as possible. That is, the characterization of the explicatum needs to 
be given in as exact a form as possible so it can be easily integrated 
into a well-connected system of already accepted concepts. Third, the 
explicatum needs to be fruitful. The revised concept is more fruitful 
the more it can be brought into connection with other concepts on the 
basis of observed facts. The more it can be used in the formation of 
laws governing the concepts in questions. And, finally, the explicatum 
needs to be as simple as possible. The simplicity of a concept is meas-
ured by the simplicity of the form of its definition and the simplicity of 
the forms of the laws that connect it with other concepts. Simplicity, 
as Carnap notes, is only of secondary concern. The factor’s importance 
only comes into play when there is a choice between numerous con-
cepts which seem to satisfy the other factors the same. When the ex-
plicatum meets these four conditions, it is said to be adequate. 
What is important to recognize is that an explication is not intend-
ing to give necessary and sufficient conditions. Since explication is a 
matter of revising, the question of whether it is true is misleading. The 
judgment that an explicatum is similar to the explicandum may be 
judged true or false to a certain degree. As well it may be judged true or 
false whether the explicatum is exact, fruitful, or simple to a certain 
degree. The reason I say “to a certain degree” is that the judgment is a 
matter of whether the explicatum is similar, exact, fruitful, or simple 
enough to be adequate. Since there is this inherent vagueness even 
within the explicatum, an explication cannot result in necessary and 
sufficient conditions.  
One thing to note is that unlike conceptual analysis, our concepts 
cannot be incorrect in the sense of failing to correspond to a mind-
independent reality. It is possible for our concepts to be incorrect in 
that they are confused, but this is not the same as in conceptual analy-
sis. The goal of the analysis is not to provide us with a correct account 
or with our shared, common theory; rather it is to eliminate confu-
sion.4 
Craig alters this method by maintaining that he is interested in a 
practical, rather than theoretical explication. He intends to throw “light 
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on the nature and origins of present practice” (1990, p. 8). He intends 
to “illuminate” the vague concept we already have by showing that a 
concept with the hypothesized role would be sufficiently close to the 
original that it itself exhibits (1990, p. 2). Those hypothesized 
characteristics are based in what the concept does for us, the value it 
has for us, what its role in our life is, etc. So, while Craig’s proposal 
owes a deep debt to Carnap’s method, it is slightly altered for his own 
practical purposes.  
So, the question is whether the standards by which to assess Craig’s 
proposal meet the criteria for an adequate explication?5 As articulated 
earlier, the concept of ‘knowledge’, according to Craig, is that of the 
objectivised concept of a ‘good informant’. Does this meet the four 
features of similarity, exactness, fruitfulness, and simplicity? Similarity, 
for Carnap, is a matter of the explicatum being able to be substituted 
for the explicandum in most cases where it has been used (Carnap 
1962, p. 7). It would seem to be the case that a ‘good informant’ can 
be used in place of ‘knower’ in most cases. In practical situations, 
which Craig is interested in, to replace the concept of a knower with 
that of a good informant would yield the same pragmatic results. It is 
important to note that Carnap does not demand “close similarity” 
(1962, p. 7). It is allowed that there are considerable differences. So, if 
one is looking for information as to whether p, it would be pragmatic 
to look for a good informant who could inform you as to whether p. 
To meet the exactness requirement a good informant would have 
to have its rules of use be given in an exact as way as possible so as to 
be able to be introduce into our already well-connected epistemic sys-
tem.6 The question here is what already established epistemic concepts 
we are trying to introduce the explicatum into. If we say that we are 
attempting to introduce ‘good informant’ into our traditional, justified-
true-belief epistemic system, then Craig’s proposal fails here. Since 
Craig has not given explicit rules as to when an informant has a justi-
fied true belief nor any notion of the evidential relations the informant 
has, it is not clear that Craig’s proposal meets this feature of explica-
tion. In fact he disavows the possibility of many of the traditional 
probability, evidential, or other justificatory concepts that play into 
our conception of knowledge. Essentially, Craig has rejected the al-
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ready established epistemic system at the outset, so it is not clear that 
he can maintain that the rules governing the use of ‘good informant’ 
have been given in as exact a way as possible. One could say that if we 
look merely at our everyday epistemic situation, the rules governing 
‘good informants’ can be introduced in a fairly exact way, but surely 
even in our everyday epistemic situation there will be some evidential 
notions. And if there are some notions of evidential or other justifica-
tory concepts in our everyday epistemic situation, then Craig’s pro-
posal has not satisfied this feature of the explication. 
The fruitfulness requirement maintains the concept is useful for the 
formation of many universal statements (Carnap 1962, p. 7). Through 
the objectivisation of the concept, Craig has proposed that we now 
have it such that the standards for recommending a good informant 
are the same for everyone even without knowing what one’s purposes 
are for acquiring the information. So, it would seem that due to the 
objectivisation of the concept, we can develop various epistemic 
“laws” to governing our everyday epistemic practices. In this way, 
Craig’s proposal does meet the fruitfulness requirement. 
Lastly, simplicity is supposed to be a matter of the explicatum being 
simple in light of the first three requirements. I take it that by not in-
voking traditional epistemic notions a ‘good informant’ is simple in its 
form. Craig’s three requirements of a good informant (that one be 
likely enough in the context to be right about p, that there are open 
channels of communication, and that there is some detectable prop-
erty) do not invoke any unnecessary requirements outside of our eve-
ryday epistemic needs. So, it would seem prima facie simple. Yet, a 
question does arise. How exactly do we specify the “detectable prop-
erty”? Craig’s move is to derive the recognizability requirement from 
the objectivisation of the concept of a good informant. It seems that 
we get the ability to detect from the recommendations of others. But 
does this meet the simplicity requirement? It is not clear. Craig does a 
lot of epistemic work in order to get to the objectivised concept of a 
good informant. Furthermore, given that we are restricting ourselves 
to everyday epistemic situations, it seems prima facie problematic to 
say that the objectivised concept of a good informant is simple in light 
of similarity and exactness requirements. I do not take it as a settled 
matter as to whether Craig can cash out the recognizability require-
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ment in a way in which to satisfy the simplicity requirement, but it 
would seem problematic at the outset. 
 
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
 
Craig’s proposal does not fall victim to many of the various worries 
that some have had about it. I believe that if we look deeper at Craig’s 
account, many of the worries fall by the wayside. Yet, a number of 
questions arise if we assess the proposal on its own terms – as an ade-
quate explication of knowledge. If we consider Craig’s proposal in light 
of the criteria for an adequate explication it is not clear that his pro-
posal is ultimately satisfying. While I do believe that he can account 
for the similarity and fruitfulness features, I am less convinced that he 
can account for the exactness and simplicity requirements. This is not 
to say that there are no ways of doing this while still remaining faithful 
to Craig’s goals. I am sympathetic to both Craig’s goals and methods, 
but I believe that more needs to be given in the way of fitting the con-
cept of a good informant into our everyday epistemic situation which 
(very likely) includes some traditional justificatory concepts.7  
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Resumo 
 
Edward Craig propôs que a epistemologia deveria afastar a análise concei-
tual tradicional em favor do que ele denomina “síntese conceitual.” Ele pro-
põe que não comecemos por encontrar condições necessárias e suficientes 
que correspondam a nossas intuições, e que, ao contrário, comecemos com 
as considerações sobre o que o conceito de conhecimento faz por nós. Neste 
artigo, vou explorar um aspecto da proposta de Craig – o bom informante. 
É esse aspecto que é central no método epistêmico de Craig, e talvez o mais 
problemático. Vou avaliar esse conceito, primeiro, articulando três preocu-
pações iniciais que alguns tiveram sobre o conceito, e então mostrando como 
cada uma dessas preocupações iniciais pode ser acalmadas ao examinarmos 
com mais profundidade os aspectos daquilo que é a proposta de Craig. En-
tão, avalio a proposta de Craig em seus próprios termos, tendo em conta o 
conceito de bom informante à luz dos critérios para uma boa explicação. O 
que vou mostrar é que, enquanto há muito com o que se possa concordar na 
proposta de Craig, há algumas questões deixadas em aberto, que precisam 
ser resolvidas para podermos dizer que uma explicação adequada foi alcan-
çada.  
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Notes 
 
 
1 I will not at this time go through Craig’s arguments for rejecting traditional 
conceptual analysis as the appropriate methodology for epistemology. The 
general line of reasoning as to why he eschews traditional conceptual analysis 
will be discussed in a later section.  
2 These worries are taken from Dancy (1992) and Feldman (1997).  
3 I should note that there are some who disagree with an explication being a 
matter of revising a concept. W. V. O. Quine (1960, § 53) and Joseph Hanna 
(1968, p. 30) agree that it is better to speak of explicating linguistic terms or, 
as Quine calls them, “defective nouns.” The reason for this is that, as they see 
it, concepts are mysterious and it is better to avoid them when it is possible to 
make the same point referring only to predicates. I leave this for the time be-
ing an open question and will continue to speak of explicating concepts since 
I am following Carnap’s method primarily and it is he that speaks of explicat-
ing concepts.  
4 We can see this by looking at an example such as the Gettier case. When 
philosophers ask “What is the nature of knowledge?” on this view, they are 
not searching for a better understanding of the concept as in the standard 
conceptual analysis. They are looking to replace our current, confused, im-
precise concept with a concept that is less confused and more precise. So, the 
traditional account of knowledge is meant as an explication in that it is sup-
posed to be a replacement for our confused concept of knowledge. The Get-
tier case, then, is intended to show that there is an important criterion that is 
not being met by our current explication of knowledge being justified true 
belief. Since an adequate explication must overlap with the initial concept, 
our intuition that Smith does not know is good evidence that the proposed 
explication does not overlap enough with our initial concept.  
5 I am taking it that Carnap’s four factors are sufficient to initially assess 
whether Craig has given an adequate explication.  
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6 Carnap maintains that it be introduced into a well-connected system of sci-
entific concepts, but I feel that we do not have to demand this latter part of 
Craig’s proposal. Since Craig is not proposing to introduce the concept into a 
scientific system, but rather our everyday epistemic situation, we need not 
demand that a ‘good informant’ be exact in a scientific sense.  
7 I would like to thank the two anonymous reviewers for their insightful and 
exceptionally helpful comments.  
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